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I. Introduction
The need to facilitate and improve access to affordable and
essential medicines for those with fatal or life threatening diseases
like HIV/AIDS, malaria, and tuberculosis is often framed in
humanitarian terms or as permissible exceptions to the protection
of patents under the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) Agreement. In this article, I
argue that an approach based on rules of State responsibility under
international law might provide an equally persuasive basis
for improving access to affordable and essential medicines.
Strengthening legal justifications such as those pursued here has
intrinsic value insofar as it enhances and complements the
growing range of justifications for improving affordable access to
essential medicines for indigent peoples. My thesis is that
countries with major health pandemics, such as HIV/AIDS, may
t George E. Pataki Professor of International Commercial Law, Albany Law
School. Thanks to Elaine Haonian Lu, Kristen Northrup, Stephen Gruberg, Michael
Kenneally and Claude Shelverton for their research assistance.
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engage in targeted compulsory licensing of essential medicines to
facilitate access to affordable medicines for their citizens without
bearing State responsibility for departing from the patent
protections of the TRIPS Agreement. More specifically, I argue
that the defense of necessity may preclude a finding of liability
against countries that depart from the provisions of the TRIPS
Agreement when they engage in targeted compulsory licensing
that was part of a larger program addressing other facets of the
HIV/AIDS pandemic.
Necessity is a customary international legal principle that
precludes State responsibility for violations of international legal
obligations under certain conditions. To plead necessity as a
ground for precluding wrongfulness of an international obligation,
a State must show that the internationally wrongful act was the
only way for the State to safeguard against a grave and imminent
peril.' The HIV/AIDS pandemic in many sub-Saharan African
countries rises to this level of gravity and imminent peril. A State
must also show that the internationally wrongful act does
not seriously impair an essential interest of the State or States
towards which the obligation exists.2 I argue that the latter is
a more problematic precondition to demonstrate in order to
justify invoking necessity as a defense to engaging in targeted
compulsory licensing. However, I argue for balancing the
competing interests in favor of the long term health needs of sub-
Saharan African countries experiencing the adverse consequences
of the pandemic relative to the patent rights of pharmaceutical
companies. In other words, my argument is neither that
pharmaceutical patent rights are not important, nor that the long
term health challenges associated with the HIV/AIDS pandemic
necessarily prevail over patent rights; rather, I argue that
advancing necessity as a ground for precluding responsibility
proceeds from the premise that there is now a widely recognized
need to balance the rights of patent holders with the rights of
consumers patented products. The Doha Declaration on TRIPS
and Public Health of 2001 and the proposed Article 31 bis of the
I Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of its Thirty-Second
Session, art 33(1), U.N. Doc. A/35/10 (1980), reprinted in [1980] 2 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n
pt. 2 at 1, 26-34, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1980/Add.1 (Part 2) [hereinafter Thirty-
Second Session Report].
2 See id.
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TRIPS Agreement definitively embrace the view that the TRIPS
Agreement ought to be read and applied as balancing the rights of
producers and users of patented pharmaceutical products.
II. Necessity as a Basis for Precluding Wrongfulness Under
Customary International Law
The necessity defense for precluding wrongfulness is a rule of
customary international law.3 As such, this defense arguably falls
within the jurisprudence of the World Trade Organization (WTO),
since the WTO judiciary interprets WTO treaties in light of "any
relevant rules of international law applicable in relations between
parties.",4 Indeed, the TRIPS Agreement cannot be construed to
exclude the possibility of invoking the defense of necessity as long
as countries with an HIV/AIDS pandemic are doing everything in
their power to address the crisis, in addition to engaging in
targeted reverse engineering and parallel importing as part of a
comprehensive HIV/AIDS policy framework.
Article 25 of the 2001 Draft Articles on the Responsibility
of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts provides the
circumstances under which necessity can be invoked to preclude
the wrongfulness of a violation of an international legal
obligation.5 Under this Article:
3 Case Concerning the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung v. Slovk), 1997
I.C.J. LEXIS 2, 70-71 (Sept. 27, 1997).
4 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 31(3)(c), May 23, 1969, 1155
U.N.T.S. 331, 8 I.L.M. 679. Article 31(3)(c ) of the Vienna Convention of the Law of
Treaties is now incorporated in Article 3.2 of the World Trade Organization's (WTO)
Dispute Settlement Understanding which provides in part that the clarification of "the
existing provisions of those [WTO] agreements [should be] in accordance with
customary rules of interpretation of public international law." Article 3.2 of the
Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, Dec. 15,
1993, General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade-Multilateral Trade Negotiations-
Results of the Uruguay Round, 33 I.L.M. 112, 115 (1994). Notably, in United States-
Shrimp, the Appellate Body in dicta noted that WTO treaties ought to be read "in light of
contemporary concerns of the community of nations." Appellate Body Report, United
States-Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, 129,
WT/DS58/AB/R (Oct. 12, 1998).
5 See Int'l Law Comm'n's Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for
Internationally Wrongful Acts, U.N. GAOR, 56th Sess., Supp. No. 10 at ch. 4, U.N. Doc.
A/56/10, Article 33 (2001). The International Law Commission first formally adopted
necessity as a defense in 1980 as part of its 32d Session Reports on State Responsibility.
Id.
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1. Necessity may not be invoked by a State as a ground for
precluding that wrongfulness of an act not in conformity with an
international obligation of that State unless the act:
(a) is the only way for the State to safeguard an essential interest
against a grave and imminent peril; and
(b) does not seriously impair an essential interest of the State or
States towards which the obligation exists, or of the international
community as a whole.
2. In any case, necessity may not be invoked by a State as a
ground for precluding wrongfulness if:
(a) the international obligation in question excludes the
possibility of invoking necessity; or
(b) the State has contributed to the situation of necessity.6
Since a plea of necessity precludes any wrongfulness as a
result of derogating from international obligations, it is applied
only in very exceptional and limited circumstances.7 By framing
the plea of necessity in the negative rather than the affirmative, the
opening words of the Draft Article on necessity emphasize its
exceptional character.8
It follows that a state of necessity refers to a situation in which
the only means available to a State to safeguard an essential
interest threatened by a grave and imminent peril is to adopt
conduct not in conformity with its international obligations.9 A
state of necessity therefore contemplates the "safeguarding an
essential interest" of a State, rather than the protection of a State's
"very existence."10 Thus, whether or not the State will not survive
without the action taken inconsistently with a binding international
obligation is not relevant in determining whether an essential
6 Id.
7 See id.
8 See id.
9 Thirty-Second Session Report, supra note 1, art. 33.
10 See id. art. 25, §1(a); see also Roberto Ago, Addendum to the Eighth Report on
State Responsibility, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/318/ADD/5-7, reprinted in [1980] 2 Y.B. Int'l
L. Comm'n, pt. 1, 13, 19, 12, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1980/Add.I (Part 1)
[hereinafter Ago Report]; see also Case Concerning the Gabcikovo-Nagymars Project
(Hung v. Slovk), supra note 3, at 71-73. (reaffirming the use of the essential interests
standard as opposed to the traditional doctrine of necessity however, rejecting its
applicability under the circumstances of the case presented).
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interest is at stake.1' The essential interest must be of an
exceptional nature in order to excuse violations of international
law. 12
Invoking a state of necessity also implies that a State is aware
of its decision not to act in conformity with an international
obligation.'3  In its explanation of the plea of necessity, the
International Law Commission (ILC) has not set forth specific
situations that would constitute an essential interest. This is
probably because the commission recognizes that whether an
essential interest is present depends almost entirely on the
circumstances unique to each individual case.' 4 In the Addendum
to the Eighth Report on State Responsibility, 5 Mr. Roberto Ago
provides examples of situations which would likely constitute an
essential interest: (1) political and economic survival; (2) the
continued functioning of essential State services; (3) maintenance
of internal peace; (4) survival of a sector of the State's population;
and (5) preservation of the environment.' 6  Another example is
"the existence of grave and imminent danger to the State, to some
of its nationals or simply to human beings."' 7
II See Ago Report, supra note 10, at 19, 12.
12 Id.
13 The British government has expressed reservations about the state of necessity
being recognized under the ILC's Draft Articles since such recognition would promote
lawlessness and undermine the rule of law in international relations. However, the
United Kingdom noted in its objections that:
[A]I1 the dame that further consideration is required as to whether there is a need
for a provision concerning action taken by a State to cope with environmental
emergencies which pose an immediate threat to its territory (as envisaged in the
Commentary, 97-02583, p. 246 paragraph 16). If so, this would be akin to force
majeure or distress.
See DRAFr ARTICLES ON STATE RESPONSIBILITY: COMMENTS BY THE UNITED KINGDOM
GOVERNMENT (1998), http://cil.law.cam.ac.uk/ILCSR/UK.rtf.
14 Thirty-Second Session Report, supra note 1, 3; see also Boed, supra note 4, at
15.
15 See Ago Report, supra note 10, at 19, 12.
16 Id.
17 ILC 53rd Report at paragraphs 12 and 13 notes that the plea of necessity may
apply to "ensur[e] the safety of civilian population." Draft Articles on Responsibility of
States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, in Report of the lntern'l Law Comm'n on the
Work of Its Fifty-third Session, U.N. GAOR, 56th Sess., Supp. No. 10 at 43, U.N. Doc.
A/56/10 (2001), available at http://www.un.org~law/ilc/reports/2001/200Ireport.htm; see
also Ian Johnson, The Plea of Necessity in International Legal Discourse: Humanitarian
N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
In light of the foregoing examples, necessity denotes those
exceptional cases where the only way a State can safeguard an
essential interest threatened by a grave and imminent peril is by
violating an international legal obligation that would, in that
instance, be considered of lesser weight. 8 An essential interest
can be an interest of one particular State, or it can be an interest of
the international community as a whole. However, an essential
interest claim rarely succeeds to excuse or preclude wrongfulness
arising from a violation of an international obligation. The plea of
necessity is not available to preclude responsibility for violations
of jus cogens norms.' 9
One historical example that is continually used as precedent
involves the Russian Fur Seals controversy in which the
international obligation in question required States to not sail in an
area of the high seas.20 The protection of the natural environment
was the essential interest asserted. In other words, the Russian
government claimed that preventing the extinction of seals was an
essential interest.2' To accomplish this objective, the Russian
government issued a decree prohibiting both the United States and
England from sailing in an area of the high seas.22 This decree
was promulgated because Russia believed that there was an
"absolute necessity" to protect against the extinction of the seals in
this area of the high seas.23 In this instance, the Russian
government was held to have satisfied the requirements of
necessity.24 Notably, the threat was made more imminent by the
Intervention and Counter Terrorism, 43 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'LL. 337 (2005).
18 See Draft Articles, supra note 5, art. 25, § I(a).
19 See infra note 58; see also ILC 53rd Report, supra note 17, at 49, art. 25, 2(a)
(noting that necessity may not be provoked if the international obligation in question
excludes the possibility of invoking necessity).
20 See Ago Report, supra note 10, at 27, 33 (citing "Force majeure" and
'fortuitous event" as Circumstances Precluding Wrongfulness: Survey of State Practice,
International Judicial Decisions and Doctrine, 1 155, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/315 (1977),
reprinted in [1978] 2 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n pt. 1, 61-228, U.N. Doc.
A/CN.4/SER.A/1978/Add.1 (Part 1)).
21 See Ago Report, supra note 10.
22 Id. (explaining that this is a violation of international law because areas of "high
seas" are not under the jurisdiction of any one individual government; therefore, the
Russian government did not have the authority to prohibit sailing).
23 See id. at 27, T 33.
24 The imminent nature of the threat was the approaching hunting season. The
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approaching seal hunting season, which would have to be foregone
had the seals become extinct.
The 1967 Torrey Canyon incident also satisfied the
requirements of necessity.25 Torrey Canyon involved a Liberian
oil tanker carrying 117,000 tons of crude oil.26  After hitting
submerged rocks, the tanker began spilling oil into areas outside
British territorial waters. 2' The British government attempted a
number of times to resolve the oil spill to prevent damage to their
coastline.28 Unfortunately, the tanker split into three pieces prior
to the successful abatement of the danger, resulting in even more
oil being spilled into the waters.29  Consequently, the British
government made the decision to prevent more spillage by
bombing the tanker in order to burn the oil still present on the
vessel.30  After the bombing, it was determined that the British
government's actions satisfied the requirements to invoke
necessity, specifically because the threat was one of extreme
danger and the government attempted all other means to prevent
further damage.3" Therefore, Britain was held not to have acted
inconsistently with its international legal obligations by bombing a
tanker outside its jurisdiction because the bombing was justified
under the defense of necessity.32
In the more contemporary decision of the Legal Consequences
of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian
Territory, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) disagreed with
threat to nature was exceptional because of the high likelihood of the extinction of seals
in the region and the impossibility of averting this threat through other means.
Therefore, the ban on seafaring in this area of the Ocean was in effect to ensure that the
hunting season was going to commence by averting the extinction of the seals. Id.
25 See id. at 28, 1 35 (citing 281 PARL. DEB., H.L. (5th ser.) (1967) 874-883).
26 Id.
27 Ago Report, supra note 10.
28 Id. (explaining that the British government began using detergents with the hope
that it would help to disperse the oil which had spread over the surface of the sea, and
after that failed, they hired a salvage team to try and resurface the tanker).
29 Id.
30 Id.
31 See id. at 28, 35.
32 Id. (explaining that after the bombing, the United Nations responded by stating
that any actions taken that are similar to bombing another country's ship on international
waters must be proportionate to the threat posed).
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the Israeli government's argument that necessity justified the
construction of a wall which ultimately forced hundreds of
thousands of Palestinians to live in "completely encircled
communities. 33  According to the ICJ, the Israeli government
failed to demonstrate necessity because the act of building a wall,
"is [not] the only way for the State to safeguard an essential
interest against a grave and imminent peril., 34 Moreover, the ICJ
noted that Israel's essential interest was inferior to its duty to
conform to international obligations and that Israel's interests
lacked the gravity and imminence required to invoke a plea of
necessity. The ICJ agreed that Israel has a duty to protect the life
of its citizens, since the preservation of human life from violent
terrorist attacks was an essential interest.35 However, the ICJ still
held that Israel must act in conformity with all its international
obligations.36
In the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros case, Hungary attempted to
justify its breach of a 1977 treaty with Czechoslovakia on the basis
of ecological necessity. Hungary argued that the locks and dam
project on the Danube River posed hazardous risks to the local
environment. 37 The ICJ recognized that the concerns expressed by
Hungary with regard to preserving the local environment from
ecological devastation related to an essential State interest, but
ultimately dismissed the plea of necessity because it found that
Hungary had contributed to the conditions under which it was led
to invoke the necessity defense.3
8
In the MIV 'Saiga' (No.2) Case, the International Tribunal of
the Law of the Sea (ITLS) found that in order to invoke the plea of
necessity, the essential interest advanced by a State must be in
33 See Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied
Palestinian Territory, 2004 I.C.J. LEXIS 20, 82 [hereinafter Palestinian Territory].
34 See id. at 139 (citing Draft Articles, supra note 5, at § 1 (a)).
35 See Palestinian Territory, supra note 33, at 140.
36 Id.
37 Case Concerning the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project, supra note 35 at 41-42.
38 Id. note 5 at 129. "[Hungary required suspension as a prior condition of
environmental investigation because it claimed continuation of the work would prejudice
the outcome of negotiations.] In this regard it cannot be left out of consideration that
Hungary itself, by suspending the works at Nagymaros and Dunakiliti, contributed to the
creation of a situation which was not conducive to the conduct of fruitful negotiations."
Id.
[Vol. 31
2006] STATE RESPONSIBILITY FOR BREAKING PATENT RIGHTS 951
grave and imminent peril.39 In this case, an oil tanker from St.
Vincent and the Grenadines was arrested by Guinean customs
patrol boats after supplying oil to some fishing vessels in parts of
the Exclusive Economic Zone of Guinea.4° The ITLS held the
arrest to be wrongful because Guinea applied its own customs
laws to an area outside its exclusive zone.4 Guinea appealed by
relying on the plea of necessity, arguing that maximizing tax
revenues was an essential State interest.42 The Tribunal agreed
that this was an essential State interest but dismissed the necessity
plea, holding that Guinea had failed to show that there were no
less intrusive means to safeguarding such an interest and how its
interest in maximizing tax revenue was in grave and imminent
peril .4 3
A. Summary of the Preconditions for Relying on a Plea of
Necessity: Essential Interest
As noted above, the measures taken by a State under a plea of
necessity must be focused towards protecting an essential interest.
In addition, the circumstances under which an essential interest
may arise depend on the circumstances of each particular case.
The variety of instances that may rise to an essential interest, as
previously alluded to, may be why the ILC has declined from
listing the circumstances under which a plea of necessity may
arise." Thus, although there is yet to be a case finding that the
long term health of a State's population is an essential interest,
under the prevailing circumstances of the HIV/AIDS pandemic in
a variety of sub-Saharan African countries, this plea is arguably
available. In fact, if we were to argue by analogy, the
circumstances under which the plea has been accepted in previous
cases strongly suggests that the long term health of a State's
population is an essential interest. Based on the precedents
discussed in the previous section, necessity was invoked to
39 MA' 'Saiga' (No. 2) (St. Vincent v. Guinea), 120 I.L.R. 143 (Int'l Trib. L. of the
Sea 1999) [hereinafter M/V Saiga].
40 Id. at 1335-36.
41 Id.
42 Id.
43 Id.
44 Thirty-Second Session Report, supra note 1, art. 33, 31.
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preclude wrongfulness for violation of an international obligation
where the essential interest was environmental protection or
ecological preservation and ensuring the safety of a civilian
population.45 The fact that the plea of necessity was successful in
these cases indicates that under international law, ensuring the
safety of a civilian population, and environmental protection all
constitute essential interests.46
In addition, based on recent jurisprudence regarding what
constitutes an essential interest, the invocation of necessity seems
to hinge upon a combination of both the imminence of the threat
to the essential interest and the availability of less intrusive
relief.47 According to a leading commentator and rapporteur of
the 2001 Draft Articles on State Responsibility, the threat must
be "objectively established and not merely apprehended as
possible., 48  In the Gabcikovo-Nagymarous case, the ICJ argued
that a grave peril appearing in the long term may still be imminent
if the realization of the peril, "however far off it might be, is not
thereby any less certain and inevitable.,,49  The 2001 ILC
45 Ago Report, supra note 10, at 19, 9 12; see also supra note 17.
46 Despite the fact that the question of necessity is dependent upon objectively
viewed circumstances, a question still arises as to whether an essential interest can be
automatically determined. States must be permitted to determine for themselves what
constitutes an essential interest. To claim otherwise, that the State must seek outside
determination as to what their essential interests are, defies logic. The State involved is
the one in the best position to make such a determination. Since an essential interest
cannot be prejudged, the state involved must make this determination based upon all
attending circumstances. Article 31(b) of the TRIPS Agreement permits states to
determine if an emergency exists. This position is further confirmed by the Doha
Declaration on TRIPS and Public Health in its recognition that HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis,
malaria, and other pandemics are all instances of public health crises that can represent
national emergencies or other circumstances of extreme urgency. See Declaration on the
TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, WT/MIN(01)/Dec/2 P4 (Nov. 14, 2001),
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto e/ministe/min01_e/mindecltripse.pdf; see also
James Thuo Gathii, The Legal Status of the Doha Declaration on Trips and Public
Health Under the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 15 HARv. J. LAW & TECH.
291 (2002)
47 See Draft Articles, supra note 5
48 JAMES CRAWFORD, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION'S ARTICLES ON STATE
RESPONSIBILITY: INTRODUCTION, TEXT AND COMMENTARY, 183 (2002); see Declaration
on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, supra note 46; see also Gathii, supra note
46.
49 Draft Articles, supra note 5, at 42.
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Commentary reiterated this finding that a "measure of uncertainty
about the future does not necessarily disqualify a state from
invoking necessity, if the peril is clearly established on the basis of
the evidence reasonably available at the time."'
The interest protected by the international obligation breached
on the basis of necessity must also be inferior to the threatened
State's essential interest.5' The jurisprudence on essential State
interests therefore indicates that economic or monetary interests of
a State are generally less significant to other essential interests,
such as long term humanitarian and ecological interests.52
B. Grave and Imminent Peril
An objective standard is used when determining the
imminence of the peril threatening an essential interest; to invoke,
necessity presupposes something "truly extreme and irresistible."53
As noted above, a peril on the far long term horizon may still be
considered grave and imminent.54 In cases of necessity, the peril
has not yet occurred, so there may be different views or
uncertainty as to the gravity and imminence of the peril.
However, a measure of uncertainty about the future does not rule
out the existence of necessity.
The critical factor is that the peril be both extremely grave and
a threat to the essential interest at the actual time. Moreover, the
peril must not have been escapable by any other means, even a
more costly alternative that could be adopted in compliance with
the international obligations in question.55 A threat must also be
imminent. The IILC's draft commentary is ambiguous regarding
what is meant by imminence or actual time. However, it is
plausible to make the case that all that is required to show
50 CRAWFORD, supra note 48, at 184 (citing ICJ REPORTS 1997, p. 7, at 42, 54).
51 See Thirty-Second Session Report, supra note 1, art. 33 (stating that a plea of
necessity must "not seriously impair an essential interest of the State [or States] towards
which the obligation existed.").
52 See MNV Saiga, supra note 39 (holding that a State's interest in tax revenues was
not superior to the interest in maintaining the status quo in the multilateral obligation).
53 Summary Records of 1613th Meeting, State Responsibility (continued), U.N.
Doc. A/CN.4/318Add.5 and 6, AICN.4/328 and Add.l-4 (1980), reprinted in [1980] 1
Y.B.Int'l L. Comm'n 158, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1980.
54 See Draft Articles, supra note 5.
55 ILC 53rd Report, supra note 17, 33.
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imminence is a demonstration that failure to act immediately will
undeniably lead to catastrophe in the future. In other words, a
threat that is guaranteed to materialize at some future unknown
date would be imminent on the premise that if nothing is done, a
catastrophe is likely to occur.56
C. Contribution and Jus Cogens
As noted above, a State cannot rely on the plea of necessity to
preclude a violation of an international obligation if it deliberately
or inadvertently provoked the existence of such necessity.57 The
plea of necessity is also unavailable where the obligation sought to
be excused is ajus cogens norm or where the obligation precludes
the existence of such a plea of necessity.58
D. The Obligations of the TRIPS Agreement
Article 27(1) of the TRIPS Agreement provides that signatory
States are obliged to protect "any inventions, whether products or
processes, in all fields of technology, provided they are new,
involve an inventive step and are capable of industrial
application."5 9 Article 28 of TRIPS confers upon patent holders
the exclusive rights to "prevent third parties not having the
owner's consent from the acts of: making, using, offering for sale,
selling or importing" patented products.6"
The TRIPS Agreement also provides for limited exceptions if
56 CASS SUNSTEIN, LAWS OF FEAR 18 (2005). Remarkably, he suggests that
catastrophe would have to be something akin to the elimination of the entire species
rather than simply a few. Such a high standard for catastrophe sets an extremely high
standard for invoking precaution at all. Id. For a review of Sunstein's arguments in this
book, please see Gregory Mandel & James Gathii,Cost Benefit Analysis and the
Precautionary Principle: Beyond Cass Sunstein's Laws of Fear, ILL. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2006).
57 See ILC 53rd Report, supra note 17, at 49, art. 25, 2(b) (noting plea of
necessity is precluded if the state has contributed to the situation of necessity).
58 See id. at 49, art 25, 2(a) (noting that necessity may not be provoked if the
international obligation in question excludes the possibility of invoking necessity).
59 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15,
1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex IC,
Legal Instruments - Results of the Uruguay Round vol. 31, 33 I.L.M. 81 (1994), art.
27§1 [hereinafter TRIPS].
60 Id. at art. 28 § 1 (a).
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consistent with the "normal exploitation of the patent. ,6' After
following an elaborate set of conditions contained in Article 31,
the Doha Declaration on TRIPS and Public Health, and the
December 2005 Decision of the TRIPS Council (now a proposed
Amendment to TRIPS), WTO members may use the subject
matter of a patent without the authorization of a patent holder.62
The TRIPS Agreement gives patent holders a twenty-year
period to possess exclusive rights to the profits of their investment
in drug research and development without the requirement to
provide preferential access to the drugs for low-income
populations.63  In contrast, in the United States under the
Constitution's patent and copyright clauses, the private benefit of
intellectual property rights is guaranteed to the extent that it
supports the public use of the information needed by scientists,
teachers, students, business people, librarians, and others.64
The flexibility contained in Articles 7 and 8 of the TRIPS
Agreement, the Doha Declaration on TRIPS, the November 2001
Public Health Decision, and the proposed Article 31 bis
Amendment to the TRIPS Agreement while important, have
proved to be illusory.65  This is particularly because of the
61 Id. at art. 30. Article 30 provides the following: "Members may provide limited
exceptions to the exclusive rights conferred by a patent, provided that such exceptions do
not unreasonably conflict with a normal exploitation of the patent and do not
unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the patent owner, taking account of the
legitimate interests of third parties." Id.
62 See Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, supra note 46;
Gathii, supra note 46.
63 TRIPS, supra note 59, art. 33.
64 See U.S. Const. art. I, 8, cl 8 (promoting "the Progress of Science and useful
Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their
respective Writings and Discoveries"). See generally James Thuo Gathii, Construing
Intellectual Property Rights and Competition Policy Consistently with Facilitating
Access to Affordable Aids Drugs to Low-end Consumers, 53 FLA. L. REv. 727, 747
(2001) (discussing "The Dialectical Character of Private Property Rights under TRIPS").
65 Heinz Klug, Comment: Access to Essential Medicines - Promoting Human
Rights Over Free Trade and Intellectual Property Claims, in INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC
GOODS AND TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGY UNDER GLOBALIZED INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
REGIME 481, 490 (Keith Maskus & Jerome Reichman eds., 2005) (citing Carlos M.
Correa, Implications of the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public
Health, Health Economics and Drugs (World Health Org., EDM Series No.12,
WHO/EDM/PAR/2002.3, June 2002); Carlos M. Correa, Implementation of the WTO
General Council Decision on Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration on Trips and Public
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implausibility of the contemplated compulsory licensing
preconditions. The use of the threat of economic sanctions by the
United States under its special Section 301 powers, in addition to
other types of pressures, have assured that the States that most
desperately need access to essential medicines are unable to obtain
them.
66
My argument is that while the currently available antiretroviral
drugs under patent are the only known treatments for those
suffering from the virus, the plea of necessity is available to enable
these countries to break the patents-inconsistent with the
requirements of the TRIPS Agreement Articles 27-31-as long as
the following are also true: (1) these medicines are intended
exclusively for indigent persons and (2) such provisioning is part
of a comprehensive program addressing as many aspects of the
pandemic as possible. In addition, even if the TRIPS Agreement
is amended with Article 31 bis, there is no guarantee that the
United States or other WTO member countries will forfeit their
right to protest the inconsistency of the Amendment and the
provisions of the TRIPS Agreement that safeguard patent rights.
It is therefore a positive step to develop a variety of credible legal
arguments, such as the defense of necessity, in favor of
compulsory licensing.
E. Applying the Plea of Necessity to the HIVIAIDS Pandemic
in Sub-Saharan Africa: Essential Interest
Sub-Saharan Africa is the epicenter of the HIV/AIDS
pandemic.67 By 2002, more than 15 million people had lost their
Health (2003) (unpublished draft). See also Frederick Abbott, "The WTO Medicines
Decision: World Pharmaceutical Trade and the Protection of Public Health," 99 AM. J.
INT'L L. 317 (2005); Peter K. Yu, The International Enclosure Movement, 82 IND. L.J.
(forthcoming 2007) (arguing that Article 31 bis does not allow less developed countries
to reclaim their lost policy space).
66 The United States is unhappy that African countries pushing for access to
essential medicines want to reopen the TRIPS Agreement. See U.S., Others Slam
African Proposal for Medicines Agreement in TRIPs Accord, 21 INT'L TRADE REP. 48,
1934 (2004); see also James Thuo Gathii, The Structural Power of Strong
Pharmaceutical Patent Protection in U.S. Foreign Policy, 7 J. GENDER RACE & JUST.
267 (2003).
67 UNAIDS, Report on the Global HIVIAIDS Epidemic, 22, UNAIDS/02.26E (July
2002), http://data.unaids.org/Global-Reports/Barcelona/BRGlobal-AIDSReport-en.pdf.
For more on the severity of the crisis, see GREG BEHRMAN, THE INVISIBLE PEOPLE: How
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lives to the disease or health complications associated with it since
the pandemic emerged in the 1980,s.68 In 2005 alone, an
estimated 2.4 million adults and children died as a result of
HIV/AIDS in sub-Saharan Africa.69 Currently, in excess of 25.8
million Africans are living with the disease.7 ° Infection rates vary
by country, but they are highest in Southern Africa.71 Infection
rates have reached 37.3% in Botswana; 38.8% in Swaziland; and
28.9% in Lesotho.72 South Africa continues to have a prevalence
rate of around 20%.7' Dramatic rises in infection rates in Southern
Africa as well as the sharp increases in the occurrence of HIV
among pregnant women in Cameroon (doubling to over 11%
among those aged 20-24 between 1998 and 2000) shows how
suddenly the pandemic can surge.74
By December 2005, women accounted for about 46% of all
adults living with HIV infections worldwide, and 57% for those in
sub-Saharan Africa. 75 As a result of the pandemic, life expectancy
in the most affected countries has reduced dramatically and there
are over 12 million AIDS orphans in sub-Saharan Africa alone.76
There has already been a noticeable decline in school enrollment
THE U.S. HAS SLEPT THROUGH THE GLOBAL AIDS PANDEMIC, THE GREATEST
HUMANITARIAN CATASTROPHE OF OUR TIME (2004); STEPHEN LEWIS, RACE AGAINST
TIME, CBC MASSEY LECTURE SERIES (2005); OBIJIOFOR AGINAM, GLOBAL HEALTH
GOVERNANCE: INTERNATIONAL LAW AND PUBLIC HEALTH IN A DIVIDED WORLD (2005).
68 See Avert.org, The Impact of HIV & AIDS on Africa, Nov. 24, 2005,
http://www.avert.org/aidsimpact.htm; see also Report on the Global HIVIAIDS
Epidemic, supra note 67, at 22 (reporting that 20 million have lost their lives to the
epidemic since 1980).
69 UNAIDS & WHO, AIDS Epidemic Update, 80, UNAIDS/05.19E (Dec. 2005),
http://www.unaids.org/epi/2005/doc/EPlupdate2005_pdf-en/epi-update2005_en.pdf.
70 Jenni Fredricksson & Annabel Kanabus, HIV & AIDS in Africa, AVERT ORG.,
Jan. 16, 2006, http://www.avert.org/aafrica; see also UNAIDS, Report on the Global
HIV/AIDS Epidemic, 124, UNAIDS/00.13E (June 2000), http://data.unaids.org/Global-
Reports/Durban/DurbanEpi-report-en.pdf.
71 Report on the Global HIVIAIDS Epidemic, supra note 67, at 8.
72 See Fredericksson & Kanabus, supra note 70.
73 Id.
74 See id.
75 AIDS Epidemic Update, supra note 69, at 4.
76 UNAIDS, UNICEF & USAID, Children on the Brink 2004: A Joint Report of
New Orphan Estimates and a Framework for Action, 3 (July 2004).
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as a result of the pandemic.7 This will negatively affect the ability
of sub-Saharan African countries to meet the education targets
contained in the Millennium Development Goals.7 8 In some
countries life expectancy has been cut in half.7 9 For example, in
Zimbabwe life expectancy will decline from 71.4 years before the
pandemic to 34.6 years in 2010.80 Since those infected are usually
in the productive years of their lives, economic progress has
slowed.8' In some rural areas, labor shortage in agriculture is
already threatening food security as a result of the mortality rates
related to the HLV/AIDS pandemic.
82
The extent of the pandemic is stretching health resources way
beyond capacity. There is no public health system anywhere in
the world, least of all in sub-Saharan Africa, which could handle
the vast numbers of those infected individuals. In many countries,
those with the infection predominantly occupy the hospital beds.83
The heavy burden on the already poorly funded health system in
many sub-Saharan African countries has led to lower levels of
care.84 As a result, a huge burden of caring for the sick is now on
the hands of families, especially those that cannot afford to pay for
long hospital stays to permit diagnosis of this increasingly
complex and pervasive pandemic.85 There are also fewer health
77 The World Bank, Education and HIV/AIDS: A Window of Hope, 4,
http://wwwl .worldbank.org/education/pdf/Ed%20&%20HIVAIDS%20cover%20print.
pdf (May 2002). Infection rates among teachers is as high as 19% of men and about
29% of women in Zimbabwe. See The Impact of HIV & AIDS on Africa, supra note 68.
78 Education and HIV/AIDS, supra note 77, at 8 (discussing as a result of the
epidemic, children are less likely to attend school, either because they themselves are
infected or because they were retained at home to take care of patients; this makes it
increasingly hard for African countries to attain education targets set forth in the
Millennium Development Goals).
79 See generally The Impact of HIV & AIDS on Africa, supra note 68. A
comparison table lists the life expectancy before the epidemic and the estimate by 2010.
For instance, Botswana's life expectancy will drop from 74.4 to 26.7, Namibia 68.8 to
33.8, Swaziland from 74.6 to 33. Id.
80 See id.
81 See id.
82 See id. (discussing the HIV/AIDS impact on labor supply through increased
mortality and morbidity).
83 See id.
84 The Impact of HIV & AIDS on Africa, supra note 68.
85 See Fredericksson & Kanabus, supra note 70.
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professionals willing to take on the increased workload and burden
of caring for infected patients.8 6  Some sub-Saharan African
countries have had 5 to 6 fold rises in the illness and death rates of
the health care workforce.87 Family dissolution as a result of a
parent, in particular a mother, dying from HIV infection is now a
norm in 65% of Zambian households.88 The pandemic robs those
left behind of caretakers and breadwinners.89
Progress in poverty reduction programs has been adversely
undermined by the spread of the infection. A study in Burkina
Faso, Rwanda, and Uganda found that the pandemic not only
reversed progress in poverty reduction but will increase the
percentage of those living in extreme poverty from 45% in 2000 to
51% in 2015.90 In South Africa, a study found that families with a
HIV infected member also experienced a reduction in income and
a concomitant reduction in the amount of money spent on
necessities including food.9'
The pandemic is also affecting productivity in the private
sector. Costs related to the pandemic include absenteeism, as well
as increased health care, recruitment, and training costs- all of
which result in declines in profitability.92 Some companies have
begun prevention and treatment programs for their workers, but
the pandemic's impact on the economies of these countries is
undermining their abilities to effectively address the consequences
of the virus. 93
86 See Rob Noble, HIV and AIDS in Zambia the Epidemic and Its Impact, AVERT
ORG., http://www.avert.org/aids-zambia.htm.
87 See Fredericksson & Kanabus, supra note 70.
88 Noble, supra note 86.
89 See Fredericksson & Kanabus, supra note 70.
90 See id.
91 See MALCOLM STIENBERG ET AL, HITTING HOME, How HOUSEHOLDS COPE WITH
THE IMPACT OF HIV/AIDS EPIDEMIC (2002), http://www.kff.org/southafrica/upload/
Hitting-Home-How-Households-Cope-with-the-mpact-f-the-HV-ADS-Epidemic-Report.
pdf; see also The Impact of HIV and Aids on Africa, supra note 68.
92 Markus Haacker, The Economic Consequences of HIVIAIDS in Southern Africa,
(IMF Working Paper, Africa Department WP/02/38 2002), available at http://www.
imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2002/wp0238.pdf.
93 Simon Dixon et al., The Impact of HIVIAIDS on Africa's Economic
Development, 324 BRIT. MED. J. 232, 232-34, (2002); Mead Over, The Macroeconomic
Impact of AIDS in Sub-Saharan Africa (World Bank Technical Working Paper No. 3,
1992), http://www.worldbank.org/aids-econ/macro.pdf.
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These and other effects of the pandemic clearly amount to an
essential State interest for the purpose of invoking the plea of
necessity. I contend that for all the foregoing reasons, the long
term health of a country's population in which there is a high
prevalence of a pandemic such as HIV/AIDS certainly qualifies as
an essential State interest. Unsurprisingly, the World Health
Organization (WHO) also considers the foregoing circumstances
to constitute an emergency. According to the WHO, lack of access
to antiretroviral treatment is a global health emergency. 94 The
WHO defines an emergency as "a sudden occurrence demanding
immediate action that may be due to epidemics, to natural or
technological catastrophes, to strife or to other man-made
causes." 95 Some observers have however noted that an emergency
is not a precondition for engaging in compulsory licensing under
the TRIPS Agreement. 96  This is consistent with the 2001
Declaration on TRIPS and Public Health.9 7 Whether an emergency
is a prerequisite, the foregoing discussion indicates that the
essential interests of countries with a high rate of HIV/AIDS
infection could argue that necessity may preclude them from
bearing responsibility for engaging in compulsory licensing if they
could also show that they stood to suffer grave and imminent peril.
The WHO's definition of an emergency seems consistent with
the observations of James Crawford, the ILC's 2001 Rapporteur
94 See World Health Organization, HIVIAIDS treatment and care; WHO Protocols
for CIS Countries, www.http://euro.who.int/document/e83863.pdf; World Health
Organization, WHO Says Failure to Deliver AIDS Medicines is a Global Health
Emergency (2003), http://whqlibdoc.who.int/press-release/2003/PR_67.pdf (providing
that "failure to deliver antiretroviral treatment for AIDS to the millions of people who
need it is a global health emergency").
95 See World Health Organization, Coping With Major Emergencies: WHO
Strategy and Approaches to Human Action (1995), http://whqlibdoc.who.int/hq/1995/
WHOEHA_95.1 .pdf (defining emergency).
96 See James Love, Not True That Public Health Emergencies Necessary for
Compulsory Licenses of Patents, Nov. 29, 2005, http://mistakesaremade.blogspot.coml
2005/1 l/not-true-that-public-health.html (citing World Health Organization, Compulsory
Licensing of Pharmaceuticals and TRIPS (Oct. 2005), http://www.wto.org/english/
tratop-e/trips e/public-health-faqe.html, recognizing that the 2001 Doha Declaration
on TRIPS and Public Health noted that countries could automatically determine when to
engage in compulsory licensing).
97 World Trade Organization, Ministerial Declaration of 14 November 2001,
WT/MIN(0 I)/DEC/2, http://www.wto.org/English/thewto-e/ministe/min01 e/mindecl_
trips-e.htm) [hereinafter Doha Declaration].
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on State Responsibility, who noted that long term predictions and
prognoses are particularly pertinent to questions concerning
threats to essential interests.9 Further, the right to life-including
increasing life expectancy and decreasing infant mortality rates-
has been dubbed the "supreme right" from which no derogation is
permitted. 99 The health of a people has a tremendous impact on all
other facets of their life. Economic development and social order
are closely linked to the health of the population.1"' The extent
and impact of the HIV/AIDS pandemic in sub-Saharan Africa
strongly suggests that the health and survival of citizens in the
affected States rises to an essential interest.
An essential interest also requires that it be superior to the
interest of other states that would be adversely affected by the
breach of the obligation.10 1 In my view, the long term health
interests of the population of African countries should be given
more weight than the property 'rights interests that would be
injured by compulsory licensing of essential medicines. As I
noted before, my argument here is not based on a tradeoff between
health and patent rights; rather, I proceed on the premise that in
the countries where the HIV/AIDS pandemic has had devastating
social, economic, and other consequences, a case for limited and
targeted compulsory licensing can be made. Moreover, my claim
is that-in balancing between the preservation of human lives of
those afflicted by the pandemic against the economic interests of
developed countries in preserving patents-the balance ought to
tilt towards preserving and protecting human life. 102
98 See CRAWFORD, supra note 48, at 506.
99 See U.N. Off. High Comm. Hum. Rts. General Comment to Article 6
ICCPR Cony. 30/04/82 (16th sess. 1982); see also James Thuo Gathii, Rights,
Patents, Markets and the Global AIDS Pandemic, 14 FLA. J. INT'L L. 261-352
(2002); Ethics and the Pharmaceutical Industry (Michael Santoro & Thomas
Gorrie eds., 2005) (covering some of the human rights issues raised by patent
protection); see also, Jamie Crook, Balancing Intellectual Property With the
Human Right to Health, 23 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 524 (2005)
100 See World Development Report 1993, Investing in Health, http://www-wds.
worldbank.org/servlet/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/1993/06/01/000009265_39707161
42319/Rendered/PDF/multi0page.pdf.
101 See Thirty-Second Session Report, supra note 1, art 34.
102 In MV Saiga, the Tribunal found Guinea's interest in maximizing tax revenues
to be inferior to its duties under the exclusive economic zone obligations. MV Saiga,
supra note 39. In an important new article, Madhavi Sunder argues in favor of a theory
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It is of course important to acknowledge that the resources
invested in research and development results in the creation of
new and useful products or processes, like pharmaceuticals, that
are generally beneficial to the public health. In the pharmaceutical
industry, this is particularly important as increased resources
dedicated to research and development lead to the creation of new
drugs and treatments for the illnesses plaguing the world today.l°3
Thus, patent protection is considered an essential interest of both
the States subject to the TRIPS agreement, as well as the
international community as a whole. However, the positive
correlation between patents and drug development is difficult to
demonstrate for diseases such as the HIV/AIDS pandemic that
affect populations that can hardly afford name brand drugs.
Since necessity will always involve a conflict between the
current situation within a State-such as that involving a public
health pandemic-and its international obligations to respect
patent protections under the TRIPS Agreement, fulfilling the
essential interest condition involves a balancing test between
competing interests. A State acting to protect an essential interest
can only do so as long as it does not "seriously impair" an
essential interest of another State.104  In other words, if the
essential interest of a State invoking necessity outweighs the
essential interest of other States, this condition is met.
Ultimately, my claim is that in light of the impact of the
HIV/AIDS pandemic, it is credibly arguable that the lives of those
involved, as well as the long term health impact, need to be
balanced against the patent rights of pharmaceutical companies.
of intellectual property that accommodates the full range of human values implicit in
intellectual production. See Madhavi Sunder, IP 3, 59 STAN. L.R. (forthcoming 2006).
See also Margaret Chon, Intellectual Property and the Development Divide, 27
CARDOZO L. REV. 2813 (2006) (arguing in favor of guiding principles to address issues of
development, such as food security, education, and health care within the intellectual
property regime).
103 Alan 0. Sykes, TRIPS, Pharmaceuticals, Developing Countries, and the Doha
"Solution," 3 CHI. J. INT'L L. 47, 60-61 (2002); see generally Amy E. Carroll, A Review
of Recent Decisions of the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit:
Comment: Not Always the Best Medicine: Biotechnology and the Global Impact of US
Patent Law, 44 Am. U. L. REV 2433 (1995) (discussing the research and development in
biotech industry and examining the pros and cons of U.S. patent law on both
international development and domestic biotechnological progress).
104 TRIPS, supra note 59, art. 30.
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Under international law, the adverse impact of the HIV/AIDS
pandemic imposes obligations erga omnes on the international
community.'0 5  In other words, the adverse effects of the
HIV/AIDS pandemic are a concern and responsibility of the
international community. As U.S. President George Bush argued
in his 2003 State of the Union address when announcing a 15
billion dollar United States pledge to address the crisis, the United
States and the international community have a moral obligation to
do something to address the worst public health pandemic in
human history.0 6 To paraphrase President Bush, the "miracle" of
modern medicine in the developed world made it incumbent for
developed countries to do everything within their power to engage
in treatment, prevention, and care of those affected by the
HIV/AIDS pandemic.0 7 In my view, the adverse impacts of the
HIV/AIDS pandemic impose not only moral but legal obligations
on the entire international community. In other words, the adverse
human rights effects of HLV/AIDS are a concern and
responsibility of the international community. As a result, the
protections of patent rights under the TRIPS Agreement must be
balanced against the obligations erga omnes that the international
community owes to those suffering as a result of the HIV/AIDS
pandemic.
Moreover, the TRIPS Agreement does not make any specific
reference prohibiting derogation in the event of an emergency. 10 8
To the contrary, it lists certain situations under which a nation may
be relieved of certain obligations.'09 In addition, the recognition of
the balancing of patent rights and public health concerns embodied
105 Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Co., Ltd. (Belgium v Spain), 1970 I.C.J. 3,
32 (Feb. 5). For further elaboration, see Joost Pauwelyn, A Typology of Treaty
Obligations: Are WTO Obligations Bilateral or Collective in Nature, 14 EUR. J. INT'L L.
907, 916-922 (2003) (discussing the collective nature of obligations such as erga omnes
obligations).
106 George W. Bush, President of the United States, State of the Union Address
(Jan. 31, 2003), http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/01/20030128-19.html.
President Bush asked the Congress to commit $15 billion over the next five years,
including nearly $10 billion in new money, to aid the fight against AIDS in Africa and
the Caribbean. Id.
107 See id.
108 See TRIPS, supra note 59.
109 Id. art. 31.
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in the Doha Declaration on TRIPS and Public Health, Article 31 of
the TRIPS Agreement, and the proposed Article 31 bis confirm
that compulsory licensing and reverse engineering are already
contemplated under the TRIPS Agreement." 0
Beyond this, a question might arise regarding whether States
that have not effectively addressed the issue of AIDS through
certain known measures in existence today have contributed to the
necessity through their acts or omissions. In the case concerning
the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project, the ICJ found that Hungary
could not rely on necessity to justify certain derogations from its
obligations under a treaty where it had contributed to the peril
from which it sought to protect itself."'
One can draw several distinctions between the Gabcikovo-
Nagymaros Project and the current situation in sub-Saharan
Africa. First, in Gabcikovo-Nagymaros, the State invoking
necessity was a party to the contract that created the peril that it
sought to avoid by violating the terms of the treaty." 2  As a
consequence, the ICJ held that the peril which threatened the State
interest in that case came as a direct result of the actions of the
State. By contrast, when dealing with the HIV/AIDS pandemic,
no nation is responsible for inviting or creating the peril." 3 Some
sub-Saharan African countries have rightly come under criticism
for their slow and relatively ineffective measures to combat the
spread of HIV/AIDS. Cultural beliefs, lack of education, and
homophobia have been identified as some of the reasons the
response to AIDS has been slower in sub-Sahara Africa than in the
developed world." 4  However, the inadequate government
110 Doha Declaration, supra note 97; TRIPS, supra note 59, art. 31.
111 Case Concerning the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project, supra note 3 (holding that
Hungary was not permitted to invoke the claim of necessity for breaking a treaty to
construct a system of locks and dams, where Hungary had previously supported the
construction and actively sought its completion).
112 Id.
113 See id.
114 See Peggy B. Sherman & Ellwood F. Oakley, III, Pandemics and Panaceas: The
World Trade Organization's Efforts to Balance Pharmaceutical Patents and Access
to AIDS Drugs, 41 AM. Bus. L.J. 353, 403 (2004); Sofia Gruskin, The Impact of
Reproductive Subordination on Women's Health: Negotiating the Relationship of
HIVIAIDS to Reproductive Health and Reproductive Right, 44 AM. U.L. REv. 1191, 1197
(1995); Ida Susser, & Zena Stein, Culture, Sexuality, and Women's Agency in the
Prevention of HIV/AIDS in Southern Africa, 90 A. J. PUB. HEALTH 1042, 1042-44
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responses to the AIDS pandemic should not be overstated. As
noted earlier, the huge numbers of infected people, the incredible
speed at which the pandemic has spread-the fastest pandemic in
human history-as well as reductions in public health spending
under the aegis of economic restructuring required by the
economic programs of the Bretton Woods institutions, give the
pandemic a magnitude well beyond the capacity of a majority of
the poor economies of sub-Saharan Africa."5  In addition, sub-
Saharan African countries have been shown to be more susceptible
to the rapid spread of the disease than others, due to both the
nature of the virus strain in most of sub-Saharan Africa and to
socio-economic factors (such as poverty) that have contributed to
the accelerated spread of the pandemic." 6  Poor countries have
fewer resources at their disposal to deal with this crisis than do
wealthier countries. The fact that a nation is less able to deal with
a crisis than another should not lead to the conclusion that they
have therefore contributed to the crisis.
Second, in the Gavcikovo-Nagymaros case, Hungary-though
wavering on the pace of the project-stood by the construction of
the project for twelve years before abandoning it on the grounds of
necessity." 7 The widespread transmission of AIDS was never a
favored policy of any government in Sub-Saharan Africa and has
been a concern for all governments since its inception in the early
1980s. The declaration of necessity on the part of developing
(2000); see also PhRMA, Challenges: Social and Political Issues, http://world.
phrma.org/challenges.html (for a general description of the problems of HIV health care
in the developing world).
115 See James Thuo Gathii, Balancing Patent Rights and Affordability of
Prescription Drugs in Addressing Bio-terrorism: An Analysis of In Re Ciprofloxacin
Hydrochloride Antitrust Litigation, 13 ALB. L.J. Sci. & TECH. 651, 660 (2003); see also
UNAIDS, Fact Sheet: Sub-Saharan Africa (2003), http://data.unaids.org/Publications/
Fact-SheetsO4/FSSubSaharanAfricaNov05_en.pdf.
116 See UNAIDS, AIDS Epidemic Update, 16-18, (Dec. 2002), http://data.unaids.
org/Publications/IRC-pub03/epiupdate2002_en.pdf; see also James Orbinski & Bernard
Pecoul, G8: Drugs for Neglected Diseases, June 24, 2002, http://www.msf.org/msf
international/invoke.cfm?objectid=05C7C503-7F90-4BDF-81 FEOAD399CFCF44&c
omponent=toolkit.article&method=full-html (arguing that G8 nations need to do more to
make inexpensive drugs available to poverty stricken countries because of susceptibility
to disease, as well as stating the fact that HIV/AIDS kills eight million people a year,
mostly in sub-Saharan Africa).
117 Case Concerning the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project, supra note 3, at 45-56.
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nations does not indicate that they have contributed to the peril by
not acting earlier. To the contrary, the declaration of necessity is a
last ditch effort to stem the tide of AIDS, taken after previous
measures proved ineffective.
Finally, since compulsory licensing or reverse engineering
would be temporary solutions to lack of treatment, it does not
necessarily follow that such conduct would seriously impair the
patent protections of the TRIPS Agreement. This is particularly so
because access to affordable drugs would release resources for
care and prevention efforts. As soon as the circumstances of grave
peril disappear, the necessity requiring compulsory licensing
would reduce dramatically over time. At that point, sub-Saharan
African countries could re-establish conformity with their
obligations under the TRIPS Agreement. The TRIPS Agreement
already recognizes that the least developed countries do not have
to come into full compliance until 2016. A majority of the least
developed countries are in sub-Saharan Africa and are among
some of the hardest hit by the HIV/AIDS pandemic. It is therefore
credible to argue that compulsory licensing for a limited time to
address a grave an imminent peril in these countries is already
acknowledged by the compliance timetable of the TRIPS
Agreement.
The "grave and imminent peril" requirement of invoking the
plea of necessity is met by the quickly spreading nature of the
pandemic, particularly in countries where prevalence rates are still
low. Paragraph 1 of the Doha Declaration on TRIPS and Public
Health recognizes the public health crisis associated with the
HIV/AIDS pandemic, malaria and tuberculosis." 8  Despite
medical advances towards the treatment and prevention of AIDS,
the illness could kill an estimated 68 million people worldwide if
current measures are not drastically expanded." 9 The fact that a
danger exists in the long run does not make it any less imminent at
the time it is realized. To avoid the long-term peril, emergency
measures need to be taken now. 20 Furthermore, the worst of the
118 Doha Declaration, supra note 97, 1.
119 Arlene Getz, The Epidemic is Growing in Frightening Ways, NEWSWEEK, July 5,
2002, http://www.24hourscholar.com/p/articies/mi-kmnew/is-200207/aikepm312971.
html.
120 See UNFPA.org, Women and HIV/AIDS: Confronting the Crisis, http://www.
unfpa.org/hiv/women/docs/women aids.pdf.
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pandemic is yet to come as the following quote illustrates:
The extent of the epidemic is only now becoming clear in many
African countries, as increasing numbers of people with HIV are
now becoming ill. In the absence of massively expanded
prevention, treatment and care efforts, the AIDS death toll on
the continent is expected to continue rising before peaking
around the end of the decade. This means that the worst of the
epidemic's impact on these societies will be felt in the course of
the next ten years and beyond. Its social and economic
consequences are already being felt widely not only in health but
in education, industry, agriculture, transport, human resources
and the economy in general.
21
For example, while infection rates in West Africa remain
lower relative to those in Southern Africa, the prevalence rate is
rising quickly. 122 The HIV prevalence rate in Nigeria has grown
from 1.9% in 1993 to 5.4% in 2003, with some Nigerian States
experiencing prevalence rates as high as 6.9%. 123
As I have suggested, one of the ways to safeguard the health of
the people threatened by AIDS is to make treatments and drugs
available that the majority of the population cannot currently
afford. In order to make such treatments accessible to the indigent
in developing nations, certain additional measures-including care
and support-must be taken by their governments. 124  Treatment
would be achieved in part through compulsory licensing and
parallel imports of drugs. 1
25
III. Conclusions
In this paper, I have argued for justified disobedience of the
121 Fredriksson &Kanabus, supra note 70.
122 Id. West Africa is relatively less affected by HIV infection, but the prevalence
rates in some countries are creeping up. In west and central Africa HIV prevalence is
estimated to exceed 5% in several countries including Cameroon (6.9%), Central African
Republic (13.5%), C6te d'Ivoire (7.0%) and Nigeria (5.4%). Id.
123 Id.
124 See Annabel Kanabus, Jenni Frediksson & Rob Noble, HIVIAIDS Treatment
and Care in Resource Poor Communities, AVERT ORG., July 26, 2005, http:I/www.
avert.org/hivcare.htm.
125 Peter Piot, Executive Director, UNAIDS, Remarks at the Ilth Conference on
HIV/AIDS and STDs in Africa (Sept. 1999) (transcript available from Fondation du
Prdsent, http://www.fdp.org).
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strong protections that patents receive under the TRIPS Agreement
in order to facilitate access to essential drugs in developing
countries. I have shown that the defense of necessity under the
doctrine of State responsibility can be invoked to preclude liability
on the part of sub-Saharan African countries that engage in
compulsory licensing and reverse engineering. The adverse
impact of the HIV/AIDS pandemic on the continent meets both the
conditions of an essential State interest as well as that of a grave
and imminent peril.
I must make it clear that I am not suggesting that owners of
patents should not be compensated when countries decide to
infringe patents to facilitate access to essential medicines.
Although sub-Saharan African countries that most need these
drugs may not be able to afford compulsory licensing, there are a
number of funding mechanisms that could fill this gap. At this
point, various compensation issues arise, including the mechanism
for setting compensation rates. Resolving these procedural issues
should not stand in the way of expeditiously and ambitiously
expanding access to essential drugs to address one of the greatest
public health challenges of all time.
By ensuring predictable access to affordable drugs,
compulsory licensing and reverse engineering would help
transform the HIV/AIDS pandemic from a virtual death sentence
into a treatable disease. Hence, those infected with the virus could
live longer and more dignified lives. These advances would
provide new hope, especially in countries in sub-Saharan African
countries where infection rates have reached as high as 30% of the
population.'26 Such progress would also lessen the disparity of
unequal access between the rich and the poor.1 27
Finally, I am not the first to call for justified disobedience of
126 See U. Pa. Afr. Studies Center, Africa: AIDS, New World Health Plan,
http://www.africa.upenn.edu/afrfocus/afrfocus.html. Southern Africa is home to about
30% of people living with HIV/AIDS worldwide, yet this region has less than 2% of the
world's population. Id.
127 See Piot, supra note 125 (noting the gap between rich and poor countries in
caring for people with HIV is becoming morally reprehensible and that the gap in care
must be bridged from several different directions including the efforts and progress made
by the UN and a number countries in negotiation with the pharmaceutical industry to
make drugs more accessible). See also Uche Ewelukwa, Patent Wars in the Valley of the
Shadow of Death: The Pharmaceutical Industry, Ethics, and Global Trade, 59 U. MIAMI
L. REV. 203 (2005)
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some trade regime rules. The late Professor Robert Hudec
strongly argued in favor of United States noncompliance with its
obligation to resolve disputes regarding whether countries had
violated its WTO rights under the Dispute Settlement Body
(DSB).128 In his view, the United States could engage in unilateral
sanctions against countries found to be in violation of its trading
rights, particularly its international intellectual property rights, as
long as the WTO would still be able to meet its trade liberalization
mandate sooner rather than later. 129 For Professor Hudec, greater
liberalization of the trading regime was a benefit worth the United
States violating its obligations under the WTO's Dispute
Settlement Understanding.'30
Here, I have argued that a strong case can be made on the
defense available under international law that will preclude
countries engaging in compulsory licensing from being in
violation of their obligations to protect patents under the TRIPS
Agreement. Unless we proceed from the premise that even a de
minimis departure from the patent protections required under the
TRIPS Agreement constitutes a TRIPS violation, there is no
reason why a defense of necessity would not be available in
principle. 31
To close on a hopeful note, it seems the DSB would be open to
an argument analogous to the one I have developed here. In
Canada - Term of Patent Protection, the Appellate Body of the
WTO's highest dispute settlement tribunal held that it did not
prejudge the interpretation of Articles 7 and 8 of the TRIPS
Agreement, which contemplate balancing between the rights of
patent holders and those of consumers of patent products.13 2
128 Robert Hudec, Thinking About the New Section 301: Beyond Good and Evil, in
AGGRESSIVE MULTILATERALISM, 113-59 (Jagdish Bhagwati & Patrick Hugh eds., 1990).
129 Id.
130 Id.
131 Notably Justice Scalia has rejected analogous arguments in the context of
sovereign debt where New York creditors argued that a default on a sovereign debt
contract performable in New York would undermine the status of New York as the
financial capital of the world. Justice Scalia argued that such an argument was
speculative and remote and did not rise to an effect within the U.S. See Republic of Arg.
v. Weltover, Inc., 504 U.S. 607, 618 (1992).
132 WTO Appellate Body Report, Canada - Term of Patent Protection, 101, AB-
2000-7, WT/DS 170/AB/R (September 18, 2000).
970 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. [Vol. 31
Rather, the Appellate Body found these Articles would await
future interpretation. That day will be coming soon. And when it
does, the plea of necessity could provide an additional legal basis
to promote a balance of the rights of patent holders of
antiretroviral drugs and the interests of millions of potential
consumers who cannot afford them and yet desperately need them.
